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our microtask-based annotation platform Wordsmith, which features incentives such as points, leaderboards
and badges on top of financial remuneration. Our analysis focuses on a particular type of incentive, contests,
as a means to apply crowdsourcing in near-real-time scenarios, in which requesters need labels quickly.
We model crowdsourcing contests as a continuous-time Markov chain with the objective to maximise the
output of the crowd workers, while varying a parameter which determines whether a worker is eligible
for a reward based on their present rank on the leaderboard. We conduct empirical experiments in which
crowd workers recruited from CrowdFlower carry out annotation microtasks on Wordsmith - in our case,
to identify named entities in a stream of Twitter posts. In the experimental conditions, we test different
reward spreads and record the total number of annotations received. We compare the results against a
control condition in which the same annotation task was completed on CrowdFlower without a time or
contest constraint. The experiments show that rewarding only the best contributors in a live contest could
be a viable model to deliver results faster, though quality might suffer for particular types of annotation
tasks. Increasing the reward spread leads to more work being completed, especially by the top contestants.
Overall, the experiments shed light on possible design improvements of paid microtasks platforms to boost
task performance and speed, and make the overall experience more fair and interesting for crowd workers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade after the term was introduced by Jeff Howe in 2006 [Howe 2006],
crowdsourcing seems to be considered by many as a, if not ‘the’, universal means to
solve virtually any kind of problem, online and offline, that requires sustained hu-
man involvement. We see it used to motivate employees to engage with less rewarding
work routines, attract the best possible ideas to boost innovation, enhance artificial
intelligence algorithms, and support ambitious social and entrepreneurial initiatives.
Achieving a goal by collecting contributions from many individuals has a long tradi-
tion, far beyond the most recent developments in the digital world. In fact, some of the
most successful exemplars of the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ in modern times, for instance
Wikipedia, predate Howe’s article. And yet, with the rise of social networks, smart
mobile devices and online platforms, the phenomenon has found a new dimension in
terms of scale and achievements - it routinely manages to mobilise very large groups
of people in a relatively short period of time, helping organisations from tech and gov-
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ernment to the military and marketing improve the ways they operate, decide, and
engage with the world.
The crowdsourcing landscape is as diverse as its applications. It includes paid mi-
crotask platforms such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1 and CrowdFlower (now Figure
Eight),2 alongside online labour marketplaces such as TaskRabbit3 and UpWork,4 and
open innovation contests in the style of Kaggle5 and Innocentive.6 It features volun-
teer citizen science systems such as Galaxy Zoo7 and SciStarter,8 and games with a
purpose (GWAPs) such as PhraseDetective9 and EyeWire.10 Putting aside the prin-
cipled differences between these forms of crowdsourcing, which make them from the
offset amenable only to specific types of problems, the success of any crowdsourcing en-
deavour will depend on the ability of the ‘requester’ - the person or institution reaching
out to the crowd - to benefit from crowd outputs and attract a critical mass of contrib-
utors. The frame conditions can be challenging as well: to be effective, crowdsourcing
needs to provide a real alternative to existing solutions of the problem the requester
is trying to solve, in terms of quality, timeliness, and costs. Getting this mixture right
is not trivial, as it requires insight into a wide array of subjects from artificial intelli-
gence and data analysis to user experience design and behavioural sciences [Feyisetan
and Simperl 2016; Feyisetan and Simperl 2017].
Aligning the motivations of the crowd with the goals of the requester and finding the
right mix of rewards to drive purposeful crowd engagement are particularly critical.
Existing crowdsourcing platforms already provide some level of support - whether paid
microtasks, challenges, or citizen science projects, each of these forms of crowdsourcing
makes some basic assumptions about what drives people to contribute to their ‘open
call’ [Howe 2006], and offers sometimes bespoke incentives to encourage a certain style
of behaviour. For example, people register on Mechanical Turk primarily for financial
reasons [Martin et al. 2014; Mason and Watts 2010], then for learning, and possibly
for fun. However, this is sometimes predicated on the task paying well. On the other
hand, in contests such as the Netflix prize11 or on TopCoder12, the crowd is mostly
technology-savvy, and takes part mostly to gain a reputation, and then for the prize, or
out of a desire to improve one’s skills [Archak 2010]. In citizen science, which is often
devoid of financial rewards, the main motivator is a blend of learning, fun, and the
wish to make a contribution to the world’s knowledge [Raddick et al. 2010; Tinati et al.
2017]. Designing a successful crowdsourcing campaign may therefore require different
incentives, which respond to the different reasons that drive people to engage. This
is not easy to achieve, as layering incentives on top of crowd motivations to change
behaviour has proven to engender unexpected effects - for example, studies have shown
that paying for work completed out of intrinsic reasons may make people contribute
less, a phenomenon referred to as ‘crowding out’ or ‘over justification’ [Frey and Jegen
2001]. Similarly, incentivising people through gamification commonly fails to achieve
1https://www.mturk.com/
2https://www.figure-eight.com/. In the paper, we will continue to refer to CrowdFlower, as the work was
carried on before the rebranding as Figure Eight.
3https://www.taskrabbit.com/
4https://www.upwork.com/
5https://www.kaggle.com/
6https://www.innocentive.com/
7https://www.galaxyzoo.org/
8https://scistarter.com/
9http://anawiki.essex.ac.uk/phrasedetectives/
10http://eyewire.org/explore
11http://netflixprize.com/
12https://www.topcoder.com/
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significant, long-term results when there is a mismatch between the rewards induced
through game elements and the needs, expectations and values of the crowd [Rughinis
2013; Zichermann 2011].
In our work we study the interplay between motivations and incentives in the con-
text of paid microtask crowdsourcing. As financial payments are just one, albeit an im-
portant, factor in using crowdsourcing effectively, we explore the use of points, badges,
leaderboards and contents to boost task performance and crowd engagement. To do
so, we use our own experimental crowdsourced-annotation platform Wordsmith, which
features paid microtasks at its core and allows requesters to layer different incentives
on top of the financial remuneration and analyse their impact.
An initial study of Wordsmith and the effects of gamified task design on paid crowd-
sourcing was presented in [Feyisetan et al. 2015]. It showed that designing a playful
interface for annotation tasks - as opposed to the functional style common to most mi-
crotask platforms - encourages workers to engage with the task more, independently
of the actual monetary reward. In the study, we were consistently able to achieve sig-
nificantly lower costs (5, 708 unique annotations collected via the game vs. 111 unique
annotations contributed in the control condition on CrowdFlower) and improve accu-
racy by almost 10% compared to the baseline. Through furtherance incentives, which
were offered to workers when we predicted they were about to leave, we could convince
workers to continue annotating, generating up to five times more unique annotations
at a comparable level of accuracy. These effects were stronger when the incentives
were personalised, with 77% of crowd workers deciding to complete one more image
when confronted with a targeted furtherance incentives against 27% in the experi-
ments using a randomly selected one. A follow-up study looked at the effects of social
incentives [Feyisetan and Simperl 2016; Feyisetan and Simperl 2017] - we asked work-
ers to complete annotation tasks in pairs and to encourage their co-worker to continue
so that both parties receive their payments. Again, the results were very encourag-
ing. Adding a collaborative component to the default microtask model led to a 233%
increase in task uptake, a 140% increase in task output and a 6% increase in inter-
annotator agreement. We also demonstrated that social furtherance incentives create
a win-win scenario for the requester and for the workers, by helping more workers get
paid by re-engaging them before they drop out.
In this paper, we focus on improving another critical success factor of crowdsourcing,
delivery time. We developed an extension of Wordsmith that allows crowd workers to
pick up tasks in near-real-time and compete. Workers were recruited from Crowd-
Flower, but instead of carrying out their annotation work at their own pace, they
were asked to pay attention to the time-sensitive element of the tasks, and aim for
a faster turnaround. Central to the competition was the leaderboard, which decides
which workers will receive a payment for their work: unlike in most paid microtasks
projects, which pay workers per unit of work accepted by the requester, in our study,
workers competed for top positions on the leaderboard to get paid.
Crowd workers used Wordsmith to complete work for a fixed period of time. They
were rewarded only if they achieved a high enough position on the leaderboard - in
other words, workers competed against each other and only a share of them (captured
by a so-called reward spread) received a payoff at the end of the contest. Leaderboard
rankings were computed and updated on the fly as a function of the number of tasks
completed and a heuristic approximation of their quality. The latter was based on
previous work of ours in which we have studied different approaches to crowdsource
the same annotation task, using standard paid microtask platforms [Feyisetan et al.
2015; Feyisetan et al. ].
The main intuition behind the contest model was that by designing the crowdsourc-
ing exercise as a live contest, which is supposed to be completed in a relatively short
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period of time, we would create an environment in which results would be delivered
quickly and with accuracy. In addition, as we did not pay all workers upfront or merely
for being available, we could keep the overall costs lower than in other real-time crowd-
sourcing approaches, which often reward mere availability as opposed to work being
done. In this context, we hypothesised that the number of workers rewarded impacted
the output volume.
To test this, we ran experiments with three sets of reward spreads (top worker; top
5 workers; and top 10 workers). The experiments confirmed our initial assumption:
the contest model resulted in more annotations at a rate that was twice as fast as
the control condition reported in our previous work [Feyisetan et al. 2015]. Further-
more, increasing the reward spread led to an increase in task output. Rewarding more
workers reduced the rate of worker attrition and kept more workers engaged.
These results could help in finding the balance between theoretical guarantees with
empirical evidence in order to select appropriate reward spreads, while scaling to data
streams comparable to real-world situations.
Summary of contributions Our platform Wordsmith offers a lens through which
we can better observe the potentials of different incentive mechanisms in paid micro-
task crowdsourcing. Our main observations are the following: while financial payments
remain important, contests can be extremely effective in encouraging workers to vol-
unteer to carry out work at higher speed. Leaderboards make workers more aware
of their performance - they drop off when faced with a potential loss of utility, i.e.,
when they believe they might not be among the winners of the competitions and hence
miss on the payments, but the faster-paced design does not have significant effects on
output quality or user experience.
The experiments shed light on possible design improvements of paid microtasks
platforms to boost task performance, and make the overall experience more fair and re-
warding for the workers. While we are not necessarily arguing for fully-fledged contest-
based microtask platforms, considering specific gamification elements that are widely
discussed in the literature [Kraut et al. 2012; Zichermann 2011] is worth further in-
vestigation. This is important not just for purely utilitarian motives on the side of the
requesters, but also in the context of the ongoing debate on ethical and fair crowdsourc-
ing [Irani and Silberman 2013]. In the same time, competitions, which are widely used
in other forms of crowdsourcing (for example, in citizen science [Tinati et al. 2017]
and in challenges [Tang et al. 2011]) offer interesting alternatives in situations when
having a faster turnaround is important.
Previous work has approached such questions mostly through studies of crowd moti-
vations [Kaufmann et al. 2011], discussing the rich repertoire of extrinsic and intrinsic
reasons that drive people to complete microtasks. Our experiments quantify some of
their findings [Feyisetan et al. 2015; Feyisetan and Simperl 2017]. We deliberately
chose a task that is well-known in the crowdsourcing literature [Gadiraju et al. 2014],
as we were aiming for microtask designs which were only minimally influenced by
interface or quality control aspects. For the same reasons, we opted for average mar-
ket prices to reward participation; lower pays would have been less attractive (and
unfair) for workers, higher ones might have appealed to people who were exclusively
drawn to financially incentives. We believe more research needs to be done to build
microtask platforms that are crowd-, as opposed to requester-centric, and reflect and
support the values and motivations of the crowd as an integral part of their function-
ality. Our research gives evidence that such efforts could be beneficial for both workers
and requesters - points, leaderboards and contests can be linked to intrinsic motiva-
tion. Workers not only completed more tasks than required, but some of them reported
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positively about the experiments on a community forum - for example, one post read
”Hello everyone! lately I’m hooked on the multiplayer tasks, waiting for 100 people to
connect”, while another one claimed: ”Hit the top 10 today. I will hunt this problem
again”.
Crowdsourcing, though riddled with its challenges from the technical to the ethical,
is here to stay. Even as it morphs continually to the tune of academic and economic
forces, it remains a force for good with groundbreaking discoveries being made daily
directly and indirectly through the wisdom of the crowd [Good and Su 2011]. Under-
standing the impact of incentives brings us one step closer to designing better, more
responsible crowdsourcing systems. This is vital not just for research purposes, but
also because of the influence crowdsourcing has on fields that have come to rely on it,
including artificial intelligence, and those that draw inspiration from it, such as the
so-called ‘gig’ economy.
Previous publications This paper builds upon previous work of ours, in particular
on [Feyisetan et al. 2014; Feyisetan et al. 2015; Feyisetan et al. 2015]. [Feyisetan et al.
2015; Feyisetan et al. 2015] used earlier versions of Wordsmith to carry out their ex-
periments. In [Feyisetan et al. 2015], we presented a first version of Wordsmith and
initial experiments into the effects of gamified task design on paid crowdsourcing. In
[Feyisetan et al. 2014; Feyisetan et al. 2015], we aimed to understand how to collect
Twitter entity annotations via paid microtasks effectively. All works implemented a
task model where workers complete tasks individually and are rewarded if they pro-
vide useful answers. In this work, we used the same Wordsmith platform and Twitter
entity annotation task; however, we introduced contests as a new incentive layer on
top of the base financial payouts.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review some of the most relevant prior work pertaining to
maximising the effectiveness of incentivised crowdsourcing. In particular, we focus
on real-time crowdsourcing approaches that aim to generate results faster; and more
generally, on methods that optimise some aspect of crowd performance, be that by
offering bespoke incentives, by assigning tasks to those workers who are more likely
to do them well and so on. As much of this background literature is inspired by and
explained using theories of human motivation and incentives design, we start with a
synopsis of fundamental work in this space.
2.1. Incentives in paid microtask crowdsourcing
2.1.1. Motivation theory. Theoretical frameworks such as the Self Determination The-
ory (SDT) [Deci and Ryan 2010] make the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation to study the reasons why individuals decide to contribute to a task. In-
trinsic motivation covers tasks that are perceived as rewarding in themselves, and is
seen as responsible for engagement in activities such as socialising and participating
in volunteering projects [Tinati et al. 2017]. On the other hand, extrinsic motives are
related to factors that are not inherently related to the actual task, but are appealing
for some external reason such as status or financial payments.
The SDT theory has been applied to motivation studies on paid microtask platforms.
[Kaufmann et al. 2011] mirrors the motivation types as fun (intrinsic) and money (ex-
trinsic) in a survey of incentives on Mechanical Turk. Similarly, [Malone et al. 2010]
describes incentives as either appealing to love, glory, or money. More relevant to
Wordsmith, SDT has also been applied extensively in gamification research [Deter-
ding et al. 2011; Seaborn and Fels 2015]; collaboration and online communities [Rad-
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dick et al. 2010; Nov et al. 2014; Tinati et al. 2017]; and contests [Bennett and Lanning
2007].
2.1.2. Monetary incentives. Money is a natural incentive for carrying out work, hence
paid microtasks remain one of the most prominent forms of crowdsourcing [Frei 2009].
Research has shown that increased payment leads to faster task completion, but not
to higher quality [Mason and Watts 2010]. Several other factors play a role in ob-
taining useful task results: bonuses, worker perception, and the variation of payment
sizes across tasks [Difallah et al. 2015; Mason and Watts 2010]. The drive to engi-
neer optimal quality, speed and volume of work with minimal financial payments has
made paid microtasks the subject of numerous discourses on the ethics of compensa-
tion [Irani and Silberman 2013]. While monetary payments can be seen as an extrinsic
motivator, other intrinsic factors have been known to contribute to sustained participa-
tion in paid crowdsourcing settings, including intellectual curiosity [Law et al. 2016];
the inherent nature of the task [Frei 2009]; and interaction with other workers [Kittur
2010]. One of the questions we are trying to answer with Wordsmith is: How do we ex-
pand the currency of transactions on paid microtask platforms to transcend monetary
payments, and encompass tasks that have an intrinsic appeal?. We presuppose that
framing tasks this way would be more attractive to workers, cost less for requesters,
and make workers perform better. This led us to study other incentive mechanisms in
our earlier works [Feyisetan et al. 2015; Feyisetan and Simperl 2017], and the idea to
leverage contests as a new incentive strategy.
2.1.3. Gamified incentives. Gamification is the use of game design in non-game contexts,
with the aim to achieve the effects of fun and engagement that are created by playing
a game [Zichermann 2011]. It often involves adding game-like rewards to non-game
activities, include social elements to encourage teamplay or contests. We understand
gamification in a broad context, comprising systems that build a complete game nar-
rative around a task (e.g., FoldIt and EyeWire) [Good and Su 2011]; employ tactics
such as micro-diversions to fend off boredom [Dai et al. 2015]; further a noble cause or
stoke curiosity [Law et al. 2016]; or engineer game mechanics (such as points, badges,
levels and leaderboards) into tasks [Deterding et al. 2011]. In a work context, each of
these classes of systems has been shown to improve productivity, drive engagement
and effectiveness, and therefore reduce costs.
Gamification practices have raised concerns about their potential to undermine in-
nate intrinsic motivation via the crowding-out and over-justification effects discussed
earlier - although this has been shown to be task-dependent [Mekler et al. 2013;
Seaborn and Fels 2015]. We also know that gamification can be more effective in col-
laborative settings; in other work of ours [Feyisetan and Simperl 2017], we designed a
multiplayer Wordsmith extension that required consensus among pairs of paid crowd
workers. This led to better outcomes when compared to the baseline, which was built
around completing the same tasks individually [Feyisetan and Simperl 2017]. Similar
findings were reported in the context of GWAPs [Von Ahn and Dabbish 2008], which
often rely, unlike our work, on voluntary participation.
2.1.4. Contest-based incentives. Paid microtask crowdsourcing has traditionally been
approached as an individualistic endeavour. Workers complete their tasks without de-
pending on, or interacting with others. Other forms of crowdsourcing, such as vol-
unteer citizen science, have experimented with models that encourage the crowd to
discuss, exchange ideas, collaborate on tasks, or compete to improve their standing in
the community [Reeves et al. 2018; Tinati et al. 2017]. In this context of paid micro-
tasks, we seek to apply contest-based incentives to improve the delivery time of crowd
responses.
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In order to carry out crowdsourcing in a contest setting, timely worker recruitment
and task uptake are critical. This comes as a result of scenarios with near-real-time
constraints - for example, when crowdsourcing is applied to fact-checking in news me-
dia, disaster management, or live data feeds. However, most solutions proposed in the
literature are often too costly for large numbers of microtasks (see also Section 2.3 be-
low for an overview of near-real-time crowdsourcing research). Contests recruit crowd
workers who are attracted to the thrill of ‘glory’ and competition to carry out tasks
quickly. This model has been seen on software coding platforms such as TopCoder
[Archak 2010], where over a million workers vie to complete challenges, or in citizen
science [Reeves et al. 2018]. Contests leverage on the urgency that comes from a fixed
completion time-frame, and the satisfaction brought by a sense of winning. They are
primarily deployed when the requester seeks one best, or final answer (as opposed to
an aggregation of worker results, which is more typical in microtask crowdsourcing), or
to increase participation. For example, the Netflix $1 million dollars challenge to build
a better recommendation algorithm [Bennett and Lanning 2007] falls in this ‘single
best result’ category. EyeWire, a game with a purpose which creates a visual map of
the human brain, routinely uses different kinds of challenges to increase the volume
of tasks completes and keep the crowd engaged [Reeves et al. 2018]. Remuneration in
contests range from a winner-takes-it-all model, which compensates only the best par-
ticipant, to more relaxed models that pay contributors who make submissions above
a certain threshold, with several theoretical frameworks set up to determine the op-
timal allocation of prizes [Moldovanu and Sela 2001]. In this paper, we designed our
contest to cover tasks that required an aggregation of results (as opposed to a single
best response), while obtaining responses as quickly as possible. This type of approach
is relevant in domains such as disaster relief and real-time visual aids for blind people
[Bigham et al. 2010].
The literature on contests goes well beyond the focus of our work, which is paid mi-
crotasks. The history of contests dates back to as far as 1714, when the British Parlia-
ment ran one to determine the longitude at sea to within half a degree [Moldovanu and
Sela 2001]. Several theoretical studies have looked at optimal contest design [Chawla
et al. 2015] and the optimal allocation of prizes [Moldovanu and Sela 2001]. A survey
of experimental research of contests is available from [Dechenaux et al. 2015]. Re-
searchers have investigated how contents unfold on existing platforms such TaskCN
[Liu et al. 2011], TopCoder [Archak 2010] or EyeWire [Reeves et al. 2018]. Empirical
studies have shown the effects of increased payoff as an indicator of contestant per-
formance. Further on, [Boudreau et al. 2011] considered over 9, 000 contests hosted
on the same platform in order to understand the effect of participant numbers on the
performance of individuals. A second group of empirical work focused on bespoke ex-
perimental setups for crowdsourcing. For example, [Rokicki et al. 2014] looked at the
effect of varying monetary schemes and information policies in individual contests,
while [Rokicki et al. 2015] explored the same problem alongside team formation strate-
gies. Both papers bear similarities to our scenario, in which contestants strategically
decide whether they continue to take on more tasks or leave Wordsmith. However, they
do not propose ways to predict worker exit to optimise task completion and delivery.
[Norrander 2006] introduced a duration model, which we also attempt to analyse in
our work, which shows the length of candidacies and factors associated with candidate
exits.
Finally, our work builds on literature which studies the war of attrition. In con-
tests, each participant enters knowing their own skill and costs, but not those of the
other contenders. Participants consider dropping out when they learn their opponents’
strengths and discover that staying would be unprofitable. A theory of how this phe-
nomenon operates in duopolies was presented by [Fudenberg and Tirole 1986]. [Kr-
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ishna and Morgan 1997] presented its relation to an all-pay auction while, while [Nor-
rander 2006] discussed attrition and exit in political primaries. [Moldovanu et al. 2012]
looked at contests with exits where contestants have the option to drop out or not to
participate with the introduction of costless punishments. Since our objective was to
maximise the total utility generated in real-time, we did not use punishments, which
some early pilots we carried out revealed to increase the attrition rate.
2.2. Making microtask crowdsourcing more effective
Several descriptive frameworks have been proposed in the literature to capture the nu-
ances of incentives engineering beyond simplistic ’fun or money’ considerations. Some
of these include MICE (Money, Ideology, Coercion, Excitement) [Burkett 2013]; RAS-
CLS (Reciprocation, Authority, Scarcity, Commitment, Liking, Social Proof) [Burkett
2013]; and SAPS (Status, Access, Power and Stuff) [Zichermann 2011]. The latter is
intended to represent a system of incentives from the most desired to the least de-
sired, and from the cheapest to the most expensive. We adopted this framework in
Wordsmith.
Mechanisms for the effective allocation of incentives have been studied in market
and auction platforms, wireless and peer-to-peer networks and corporate organisa-
tions. In the context of crowdsourcing, several studies have been carried out that apply
game-theory techniques to incentive design [Xie et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2012]. These
papers focus on financial incentives and a premise of inter-player strategy dependency.
Not all crowdsourcing tasks can be modelled in this way; we adopt a probabilistic ap-
proach based on prior player behaviours to predict appropriate incentives beyond the
purely financial (see also [Feyisetan et al. 2015]). Similar techniques are used for vari-
ous purposes in crowdsourcing design, in particular to inform the assignment of tasks
to workers or to predict task completion [Demartini et al. 2013; Sheng et al. 2008].
A large body of work has been dedicated to task and workflow design, as well as qual-
ity control (see, for instance, [Michelucci 2016] for a good compilation). We take their
findings into account when implementing the basic CrowdFlower interfaces, checking
for spam and validating and aggregating the results.
2.3. Improving delivery time
Longitudinal studies of crowdsourcing marketplaces such as Mechanical Turk [Difal-
lah et al. 2015] reveal how microtasks have evolved to support scenarios in which work
cannot take days or hours, but must be delivered in seconds and under [Bernstein et al.
2011]. For near-real-time behaviour, two components are critical: prompt recruitment
of workers and fast completion of tasks. In this section, we compare our approach with
previous research in microtask crowdsourcing, which has proposed improvements to
these components.
2.3.1. Timely worker recruitment. Several models have been put forward to ensure timely
availability of crowd workers. For example, Adrenaline [Bernstein et al. 2011] em-
ployed a retainer model, while in Viz-Wiz [Bigham et al. 2010] workers signed up in
advance and were kept engaged, at a cost, until the work arrived. Other approaches
relied on very large crowds [Lasecki et al. 2014], using queuing theory or predictive
recruitment to model workers’ arrival and task assignment [Bernstein et al. 2012],
or repeatedly posting the tasks to make them more visible to workers [Bigham et al.
2010]. In our experiments, we incorporated a combination of these ideas to generate
our on-demand crowd: we repeatedly posted tasks, recruited in advance, requested for
a larger crowd than required, and used an audio alert to prompt workers when the
contest started. At the same time, by virtue of our contest model, we rewarded only a
small share of the workers, hence keeping the costs down.
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2.3.2. Timely task completion. Some of the techniques found in the related literature in-
clude: rapid refinement, which dynamically narrows the search space following signs
of worker agreement [Bernstein et al. 2011]; stream parallelism, which splits the task
into sub-tasks and assigns them to different pools of workers in parallel [Bigham et al.
2010]; temporal division, which breaks the task down into time slices as more work
becomes available [Lasecki et al. 2011]; warping time [Lasecki et al. 2013], which al-
lows workers to listen to audio streams at reduced speeds; and a Map Reduce alike to
organise complex workflows [Kittur et al. 2011]. Our model uses stream parallelism to
assign work to several groups of workers, and variants of temporal division and time
warping to display tasks to each overlapping batch of workers for an extended period
of time. Combined with the mixed cardinal-ordinal contest, these techniques create a
powerful mechanism to solve tasks twice as fast as the evaluation baseline (see Section
7).
3. CONTEST-BASED ANNOTATION TASK
In our experiments, we used a text annotation task model in relation to real-time
crowdsourcing. For this reason, the task consists of a total of n posts, P = {p1, ..., pn},
each containing m entities E = {e1, ..., em} to be annotated, where m < Mi! + Mi and
Mi is equal to the number of text tokens in post pi. The posts arrive at a constant rate
λ and each has a processing rate of µ. There are n workers in a pool to serve the task
queue such that, to keep up with the requests, the ingress load (task intensity) L = λ/µ
stays less than the number of workers n, i.e., L < n.
Tasks that are not solved are dropped of the queue as opposed to being kept in-
definitely in the buffer [Bernstein et al. 2012]. They are solved using a first-in-first-
out scheduling and processing scheme, in which already recruited workers are sought
to carry out new tasks (as opposed to recruiting additional workers for new tasks).
Therefore, the requester is looking for an optimal processing rate µ, and needs to keep
workers motivated to carry out as many tasks as possible.
Requester The requester asks the crowd to complete a series of tasks in real-time.
The requester needs to determine the experiment setup in terms of: (i) the number of
contestants; (ii) the number and size of prizes; and (iii) the contest constrains to max-
imise the effort exerted by all contestants
∑w
i=1 i. This is different from contests such
as the Netflix Challenge [Bennett and Lanning 2007], where the principal’s objective
was to elicit a single best response to a task.
The requester does not only desire to maximise the total exerted effort, but also
to maximise some utility function of output quality
∑w
i=1 qi. The requester therefore
needs to maintain incentives for highly skilled workers, and motivate low skilled work-
ers to exert more effort while adjusting the prize spread.
The requester defines: (i) a completion time constraint T, which depends on the num-
ber of posts n and their arrival rate λ; and (ii) a quality constraint Q, which denotes the
minimum number of labels expected from each worker to be eligible for payment. The
latter is essential in hybrid tasks; for example, the task might have been pre-labelled
by a machine to determine the probable number of named entities (this serves as the
quality constraint Q), while the crowd workers identify those entities and type them
[Feyisetan et al. 2015].
The requester is able to observe the baseline quality of each worker’s output, based
on the pre-computed number of entities and the number of entities submitted by the
worker. The requester is then able to use this information to construct the contest by
assigning a quality score to every crowd answer - therefore, contestants are ranked
not only based on their effort (number of posts annotated), but also on the quality of
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their output. The reward mechanism awards a prize Aj to a worker wj within a reward
spread (e.g., the worker was within the top 5 or top 10).
Workers There is a set of n workers, W = {w1, ..., wn} participating in the contest,
each with the ability to carry out entity annotations. Each worker w ∈W has a private
skill level ςi (also known as expertise or ability), and for each post in an annotation
task, chooses to exert a level of effort i ≥ 0. The skill level is drawn independently of
other workers from the interval ςi ∼ [0, 1],∀w ∈W , according to a distribution function
F with density f(ς) = dF (ς) > 0.
The effort exerted is drawn from the interval i ∼ [0, ], in which the maximum effort
expendable is constrained by the running time t of the contest, which in turn is a
function of posts per unit time and total number of posts. The quality qi of each worker
wi is determined by: (i) the skill level ςi; (ii) the effort exerted i; and (iii) a requester
variable δi. The requester variable δi is a function of the requester’s review process and
perception of quality, in comparison with the worker’s internal tagging bias, which is
markedly present in human judgement tasks. This value is constant across annotation
posts ∀pi ∈ P ; therefore, two workers exerting the same effort to annotate the same
post would differ only on their skill, since the requester’s variable is constant for that
post. The quality of a submission is thus given as: qi = ςii + δi. In our experiments,
the requester’s variable was a measure of results in a pre-computed gold standard set
[Feyisetan et al. 2015].
Each worker wi seeks to maximise their expected utility. This depends on the num-
ber and value of prizes, and on the number of contestants and value of their efforts.
A worker’s utility Ui is given by Ui = Vj − c(i), if the worker wi wins prize Vj , or by
Ui = −c(i) otherwise, where Vi is one of k prizes to be awarded by the requester, and
c(i) is the worker’s cost function, which is a strictly increasing function dependent on
exerted effort where c(0) = 0. Each prize Vj above point k is positive, or zero otherwise.
We did not model negative rewards (punishments), as they did not seem to have the
desired effects in early pilots we carried out.
During the contest, crowd workers are shown a list of tasks which arrive in near-
real-time (in our experiments we used Twitter posts, but they could equally be images
as in [Bigham et al. 2010] or other objects). The workers are to annotate as many of
them as possible within a time window. The incentives mechanism awards a prize Aj
to a worker wj within a reward spread (for example, the worker is within the top 5 or
top 10).
Exit A worker would always seek to maximise their expected utility given the number
and value of prizes; the number of contestants; and the value of their efforts. In our
experiments, it was possible for workers to view their ranked position in real-time with
respect to their closest contenders using a k-neighbours leaderboard, as presented in
the medium information policy contest strategy by [Rokicki et al. 2014]. A worker
far outside the reward spread might inadvertently decide to exit the contest to avoid
further loss of utility. The worker close to the reward spread might, however, decide to
remain in the contest in the hope of displacing a close contender.
4. CONTESTS AS CONTINUOUS TIME MARKOV CHAINS
4.1. Model
We modelled the contest-based annotation task as a continuous time Markov chain
(CTMC). To understand CTMCs, we first define some key concepts.
A stochastic process is defined as a collection of random variables. It describes the
evolution in time of a random phenomenon. Therefore, we say that the stochastic pro-
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cess is indexed by time i.e., the random variables X for each time point t is given
by X = {X(t) : t ∈ T}. When T = N, it is a discrete-time process, however, when
T = [0,∞), it is a continuous time process.
The Markov property refers to the memoryless property of a stochastic process. A
stochastic process X(t) has the Markov property if the conditional probability distri-
bution of its future evolution depends only on its current position, not on how it got
there. i.e. given X(t) : t ≥ 0 with state space S, we say it has the Markov property if:
P (X(t) = j|X(s) = i,X(tn−1) = in−1, ..., X(t1) = i1) = P (X(t) = j|X(s) = i), (1)
where 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tn−1 ≤ s ≤ t is a sequence of n+1 times and i1, i2, ..., in−1, j ∈
S are states in the state space. Therefore, a continuous time stochastic process X =
{X(t) : t ≥ 0} is called a continuous-time Markov chain if it exhibits the memoryless
Markov property.
Revisiting our contest-based annotation task, we assume that the n Twitter posts
arrive according to a Poisson process with rate µ. This Poisson process is a continuous-
time Markov chain with state space S = {0, 1, 2, ...} representing the worker annota-
tions. Therefore, at any time t, a worker i is in a state of annotating the jth tweet. The
time it takes for the worker i to annotate this tweet is represented as an exponential
random variable, which transitions the worker to state j + 1.
The question then is: what ‘explains’ the rate at which a worker annotates each
tweet. In our modelling in this section, and in subsequent empirical experiments, we
evaluate one variable to explain the annotation rate. We have earlier described this
as the reward spread which governs, at any time t, if worker i is currently eligible to
receive a payment based on their leaderboard rank.
To model our contest-based annotation task as a continuous time Markov chain, we
define the following variables:
Observed variables:
— Si(t): the number of annotations of worker i in finite time t
— tij : the time of the jth annotation of worker i
— τ ij : the annotation time for worker i after the jth annotation
Hidden variable(s):
— θi: the annotation rate parameter for worker i
The time a worker spends on annotating a tweet is calculated as:
τ ij ∼ P
(
τ i | {Sk(tik)}k; θi
)
= exp
(
τ i; λ . f({Sk(tik)}k; θi)
)
= f
(
{Sk(tik)}k; θi
)
exp
(
f({Sk(tik)}k; θi)
)
τ ij
Furthermore, the time of the next annotation, and the next state can be expressed
as:
tj+1 = tj + τ
i
j ; S(tj+1) = S(tj) + 1
The parameter λ describes the annotator ‘behaviour’ within the reward spread. This
biases workers to either exert more or less effort based on their rank i.e., if a worker
is currently eligible to be paid, they might either choose to exert more effort to extend
their lead, or they might relax since they are already in the top ranks. Similarly, a
worker outside the reward spread might either give up or exert more effort to displace
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Fig. 1: State transitions
one of the top workers. We modelled λ using the gamma distribution f(x;α, β), and
half-normal distributions fY (y;σ), where Y = |X| and X ∼ N (µ, σ2). The half-normal
distribution biases our belief that some workers will increase their effort, especially
when they are outside but close to the reward spread.
λ ∼

βαxα−1e−βx
Γ(α)
, if worker is eligible to be paid
f(x;α, β) +
√
2
σ
√
pi
exp
(
− y
2
2σ2
)
, otherwise
Therefore, simplifying and expressing this for a single worker:
P
(
{tij}Nij=0 {Si(tij)}Nij=0 | θi
)
=
Ni∏
j=0
f
(
{Sk(tij)}k; θi
)
exp
(
f({Sk(tij)}k; θi)
)
τ ij
Computing this for all the workers, we get:
P
(
T, S | θi
)
=
n∏
i=1
Ni∏
j=0
f
(
{Sk(tij)}k; θi
)
exp
(
f({Sk(tij)}k; θi)
)
τ ij
Expressing this as a log loss for training a learning model, we obtain:
− logP
(
T, S | θi
)
=
n∑
i=1
Ni∑
j=0
− log f
(
{Sk(tij)}k; θi
)
+ f
(
{Sk(tij)}k; θi
)
; τ ij (2)
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Fig. 2 represents a graphical model that presents the variables τ , λ, f and θ in our
model. The arrows describe how each variable influences or affects another. Therefore,
obtaining the values τ ij (i.e., for each worker i at every annotation point j) helps us
predict how much time the annotator will spend in the entire contest.
Fig. 2: Plate notation for CTMC contest-based annotation task
4.2. CTMC simulations
We ran a series of simulations to test the CTMC model for contest annotations tasks.
The independent variable is the reward spread which we hypothesise can explain the
annotation rate of workers in the contest.
To aid visualisation, we ran the simulation using 5 annotators, 100 annotations and
200 time steps. First, we generated λi values which represent the behaviour of each of
the 5 workers when they are within the payment or no payment leaderboard ranks.
Fig. 3: λ rates for each worker representing how much effort a worker exerts when
they are within and outside the reward spread
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Fig. 3 displays randomly generated λi values for each workeri. From Fig. 2, we know
λi influences τ ij , therefore, we can simulate a contest run to see how the worker’s
strategies pan out: worker1 who exerts significantly more effort only when they are
not getting paid, or worker3 that exerts much effort even when they are in the lead.
Fig. 4: Contest simulation using generated λ rates
The results in Fig. 4 paint a picture of how the change in annotation rates within
and outside the reward spread affect how the entire contest turns out. This becomes
more evident as the race progresses, in this case, with worker3 coming out at the top
with their λ annotation strategy.
Therefore, Fig. 4 illustrates that we can go from defining values for λ to simulating
an entire contest run. The challenge then is to do the reverse, that is, to infer the
values of λ from observing the transition τs in a contest. Learning this would allow
us to modify the reward spread in a real-life contest, which would in turn modify λ,
resulting in a desired contest outcome. The desired outcome from a requester’s point
of view would be to maximise the total annotations from all workers.
Using the loss function derived in Eq. 2, we trained a model to learn the λ rates
of each of our 5 workers. We used the worker’s rank at each time step, the elapsed
time, the number of annotations left, and whether the worker was within or outside
the reward spread as features to train the model.
The results in Fig. 5 illustrate that we can learn the λ rates of workers which de-
scribe how they perform when they are within and outside the reward spreads. For
example, observing the results of worker0 in Fig. 5 shows that the λ0 rate when the
worker is outside the reward spread is normally distributed around a mean value of
1.15 which is very close to the value of 1.12 generated and displayed in Fig. 3. Similarly,
the λ0 rate when worker0 is within the reward spread is normally distributed around
1.7 which is close to the generated value of 1.66.
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Fig. 5: Learned values of λ rates for each worker
5. THE WORDSMITH PLATFORM
Having laid the theoretical models underpinning our experiments, we now give a gen-
eral overview of the Wordsmith platform and elaborate on those components that are
relevant to our contest experiments.
5.1. Overview
Wordsmith is a platform for carrying out paid microtask crowdsourcing; Fig. 6 depicts
a screenshot. It supports a range of annotation tasks, including text and image anno-
tation. Further on, Wordsmith features multiple task, feedback and interface elements
that allow for single-worker, multi-worker and contest-based task completion.
The general task annotation works as follows: Workers are recruited from an ex-
isting microtask platform, for instance CrowdFlower, and redirected to our platform;
the entry on CrowdFlower explains the task (e.g. identify people in tweets); the re-
quirements (e.g. annotate at least ten images); and the financial remuneration. It also
includes a a tutorial consisting of screenshots of the task interface on Wordsmith to
give workers a step-wise idea on how to approach the task effectively.
Requesters specify the conditions for workers to receive their payments – for in-
stance, a minimum number of annotations being carried out. However, workers are
generally allowed to carry out as many tasks as they wish, beyond the task threshold
which guarantees their payment. The requester can hence take advantage of the fun
factor and game-like immersion that comes from completing the task in a gamified
setting. Workers are also allowed to skip tasks - they can still receive their reward as
long as overall they meet the conditions of the requester.
Requesters can also define game levels associated with an increasing volume of work
to be completed or, if possible, with work of increasing difficulty. They also determine
which worker activities are rewarded with gamification elements, including points,
badges, and, as in [Feyisetan et al. 2015], additional payments.
5.2. Contest design
The contest setting on Wordsmith allowed for multiple workers to connect to the sys-
tem at once and carry out annotations simultaneously.
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Fig. 6: Wordsmith start interface. On the left hand side, the worker sees their current
level, the number of tasks completed, the number of points obtained, and their badges.
On the right hand side, they can consult the leaderboard and a feed of activities of
other workers who engaged with the task.
The current implementation of contests in Wordsmith builds upon the crowdsourced
NER work which was presented in [Feyisetan et al. 2015; Feyisetan et al. ]. In that
work, we discussed the basic design of a text annotation microtask for Twitter posts,
while here the focus is on the specific challenges arising from the fact that the annota-
tions need to be delivered under significant time constraints. While the contest model
was tested for NER on microposts, it can be used for other types of labelling tasks that
arrive in a real-time feed, with or without predefined label categories, for example for
images like in [Bigham et al. 2010]. For other text streams, the system would need
first to divide the text into smaller chunks, which can still be treated by workers as
microtasks in terms of the length of the text. [Bernstein et al. 2015] offers interesting
insights into how to process larger text documents via paid microtask crowdsourcing.
5.2.1. Input and output. The system takes in a raw input of streaming posts and per-
forms an initial sequence of processing on it. For our study, we focus on filtering out
non-English tweets using the language tag of the incoming tweets. We then carry out
part-of-speech tagging to recognise tweets with proper nouns. This is used to build a
pseudo-quality score for each annotation (presented earlier as the requester’s variable
δi) i.e., if our POS tagger detects two different contiguous proper noun sets, we can
expect an annotation result of at least two entities (although this does not hold strictly
if there are no proper nouns e.g., entities might be recognised as noun phrases by some
taggers).
The system outputs a processed stream of English tweets, (tweet1, ..., tweetN), where
each tweet is represented as a tuple containing a reference identifier, the tweet string
and the associated requester’s variable δi. Each tweet in the stream advances in linear
discrete time at a constant rate, with each time point represented as unique integer
value in seconds (although, worker annotation and exit is represented in milliseconds).
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5.2.2. Temporal division and stream parallelism. The stream is bucketed into distinct time
intervals using windows. A window consists of a constant number of microtasks emit-
ted per unit time, which may or may not have been built over a buffer depending on
varying throughput levels. Within each window task slice, microtasks are clustered
and parallelized to different workers. Each cluster is a task unit consisting of a list of
objects which is allocated to each worker for annotation. This follows a Map Reduce
paradigm wherein each worker has a small task unit to solve, which is recursively built
up to the final solution for the requester. The Map process involves local processing on
individual nodes (annotating workers), while the Reduce process involves the merging
of results to select best responses for overlapping task annotations.
5.2.3. Contest interface. The contest interface consisted of a central annotation panel,
in which the workers saw the current list of text snippets as described in [Feyisetan
et al. 2015; Feyisetan et al. ]. After selecting the piece of text to analyse, the workers
could either annotate the entities using predefined categories, mark the post as having
no entities, skip the task all together, or go back to the list. Fig. 7 shows a screenshot.
Fig. 7: Wordsmith contest interface. The central pane contains a microtask feed, which
is updated according to the parameters fixed by the requester. Each task requires the
player to identify instances of people, locations and organisations. On the right hand
side, the players can see how they perform compared to others.
Each worker received a baseline score x for annotating a tweet with an arbitrary
number of entities and a higher score 5x for correctly annotating the pre-computed
number of entities (based on the gold standard tags). These figures were drawn from a
series of observations and early pilots, which also ruled out the use of negative scores
and qualifying questions, as both led to a very sharp rate of exits. As noted earlier,
workers had access to a k-neighbours leaderboard, which lists contenders immediately
above or below.
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5.2.4. Requester parameters. Wordsmith affords the requester a number of configurable
parameters including:
—Number of workers W : count of those who could connect to the platform. All the
workers had to be connected before the task starts.
—Leaderboard: requesters can choose between listing the top−k workers; or display-
ing the k contenders above and below the worker.
—Number of tasks P : this represents the total number of tasks which are to be pro-
cessed, each consisting on n objects to be annotated.
—Window size w: this is number of tasks which is sent out to a number of workers
per time slice (see below).
—Task unit time µ: this is the delay time, for which a list of tasks remains available
for annotation to a worker before the next set of tasks arrive.
—Task arrival rate λ: this variable measures the number of tasks, which are chan-
nelled to the platform per unit time.
—Task intensity L (or ingress load): this is computed as L = λ/µ, based on the task
arrival rate λ and the agent processing rate µ.
—Task unit size: represents the number of tasks that a worker actually sees on screen
at any given time, which is a fixed percentage of the window size w.
—Total task time T : computes how long the contest would take as a function of the
number of tweets and the window size: T = Pµ/w.
—Reward spread s: the reward spread denotes the number of workers to be paid in
the current contest.
5.2.5. Warping time. Warping time is a strategy, in which a workers task slice in a real-
time assignment is deliberately slowed down to afford for maximal worker cognition in
undertaking the required task. For example, [Lasecki et al. 2013] used time warping
to slow down audio playback so crowd workers could effectively transcribe a given por-
tion of speech. This was recursively done for each worker, after which the individual
results were successively merged to create a single result. Following our stream par-
allelism approach to dividing up the incoming microposts, a window of 200 tweets was
presented to 20 workers.
We adopted the approach by [Lasecki et al. 2013] denoting: (i) an in-period Pi where
the annotation stream for a worker group comes in; (ii) a speed reduction rate rr; and
(iii) the compensating out-period Po where the worker group WGi rejoins the live real-
time stream. We used a speed reduction rate rr of 10 i.e., the 20 workers experienced
a streaming rate of 1/rr = 0.10 (i.e. one tenth speed, 10 seconds rather than 1 second)
while annotating. During these 10 seconds, the workers were presented with static list
of tweets, from which they could select individual entities to annotate. The stream of
tweets in the buffered out period was then emitted at a speed of:
N − 1
N − rr (3)
In our experiments we made certain assumptions, which would be handled differ-
ently on a live data feed. For example, all members of a worker group (20 workers in
our case) were presented with the annotation tasks at the same input period Po, which
was a function of our streaming approach. We re-purposed existing datasets from liter-
ature into a streaming API. In actual practice, each worker would have a unique input
period Po similar to [Lasecki et al. 2013].
5.2.6. Task allocation. There are several approaches to distribute the incoming stream
of tasks to the available workers in parallel. In a round robin assignment, each bin
would be sequentially assigned from the window of current annotation tasks to the
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next available worker, e.g., in our experiments, we assigned each worker 10 tasks from
1 out of 20 bins derived from the streaming window of 200 tasks.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe how we carry out empirical contest-based crowdsourcing
experiments using Wordsmith.
6.1. Datasets
The dataset consisted of 7, 600 aggregated tweets from four corpora from the litera-
ture. These datasets were from different time frames and all come along with gold
standards, which we used to perform quality checks and compute contest scores.
—The Ritter corpus by [Ritter et al. 2011] which consists of 2, 400 tweets. The tweets
were randomly sampled, however the sampling method and original dataset size are
unknown. It is estimated that the tweets were harvested around September 2010.
—The Finin corpus by [Finin et al. 2010] consists of 441 tweets which was the gold
standard for a crowdsourcing annotation exercise. It is not stated how the corpus was
created, however our investigation puts the corpus between August to September
2008.
—The MSM 2013 corpus, the Making Sense of Microposts 2013 Concept Extraction
Challenge dataset by [Cano Basave et al. 2013], which includes training, test, and
gold data; for our experiments we used the gold subset comprising 1450 tweets.
—The Wordsmith corpus, reported in one of our previous works [Feyisetan et al.
2015]. From the a corpus of six billion tweets, we sampled out 3, 309 English ones
using reservoir sampling - a family of randomized algorithms for sampling k items
from a list S of n items.
6.2. Experimental setup
6.2.1. Overview. Our experiments were designed for time-bound microtask crowd-
sourcing scenarios, which require speedy human-cognitive intervention. The workers
were presented with a time-delayed view of streaming tweets. Each experiment com-
petition ran for about six minutes, during which, workers labelled as many tweets as
possible, identifying instances of people, locations and organisations. The objective of
each worker was to qualify for a set of top reward spots, which guaranteed a payoff.
Unlike traditional paid microtasks, only a few of the workers got paid even if they pro-
duced correct annotations. This added to the urgency and the competitive drive that
sped up the task to near real-time completion rates. We considered several questions,
chief of which was: how does the reward spread affect the total task output of all the
contest participants. Other questions naturally follow, such as: the relationship be-
tween reward spread and annotation time, annotation quality and worker exit. These
formed the basis of our experimental conditions.
6.2.2. Timely worker recruitment strategies. In order to achieve timely worker recruit-
ment, we adopted a combination of several strategies:
— We posted our tasks repeatedly in order to maintain visibility within the recent tasks
view of workers.
— We created multiple tasks that pointed to our Wordsmith platform, but ensured that
workers could connect only once by keeping track of the connection IP address.
— We attempted to recruit, on the average, 10 times the number of workers than we
required (around 1, 000 workers).
— We posted the tasks in bits as a work around for the scheduling mechanism which
CrowdFlower uses in displaying unfinished tasks to new workers.
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— We introduced an acoustic signal to notify workers once the requisite number of con-
testants had connected to the system.
Workers could see in real-time how many more contestants were required to connect
before the task started. We also ensured that impatient workers were reconnected
whenever they refreshed their screens, however, once the required number of workers
were connected, no further connection was allowed.
6.2.3. Requester parameters. In each experimental condition, the number of workers
was 100, viewing a k = 3 neighbours leaderboard; the number of tasks (in our case
Twitter posts) desired to be processed was 7, 600; the window size was 200; the task
unit time was 10 seconds, the task unit size was 10. This means that a worker saw 10
tweets out of the current stream of 200 tweets for a period of 10 seconds during which
the worker was to label as many as possible before the next set of tasks arrived. The
task arrival rate was 200/10, which means 20 tweets per second, and the total contest
time was (7, 600 ∗ 10)/200 = 380 seconds (6 minutes 20 seconds).
Each contest had a payoff of $0.10 for each prize payment, replicating [Feyisetan
et al. 2015; Feyisetan et al. ]. Our model rewarded each winner with the same payment,
as opposed to other variants which take into account the ranking of the participants
or implement some other form of reward sharing. A reward spread of 1 stands for a
winner-takes-all condition, in which only the top worker gets paid and with a reward
spread of 10, the top ten workers are paid. The parameters have been explained earlier
in Sec. 5.2.
6.3. Experimental design
6.3.1. Overview. We set up our experiment using the between-subjects design. Each
worker could only be assigned to one of the experiment conditions. This was enforced
using the worker’s connection IP address as stated earlier in Sec. 6.2.2. Each user
was randomly assigned to one of the experiment conditions and they were not able to
pre-select which condition they ended in. The multiple tasks posted on CrowdFlower
and referenced in Sec. 6.2.2 served as an identical entry point for each worker. From
there, they are redirected to a centralized server that randomly assigns the workers to
a certain treatment.
Our experiments had one independent variable: the reward spread, and one depen-
dent variable: the task output. As we described in our theoretical modelling in Sec.
4, our hypothesis is that the reward spread can ‘explain’ the changes in the contest
output (referenced as the total annotations carried out by the workers). Therefore, the
variable that a requester seeks to optimize is the total output, and they seek to control
this by varying the reward spread.
— Independent variable: reward spread
—Dependent variable: task output
6.3.2. Conditions. The experiments in this paper are compared against a control con-
dition from an identical task reported in [Feyisetan et al. 2015; Feyisetan et al. ]. In
that study, workers were also required to annotate named entities in tweets, however,
they were not under any time constraint to carry out the task, and every worker that
successfully completed the task got paid. In this paper however, the experimental con-
ditions or treatments are based on the different reward spreads that crowd workers
are randomly assigned to, with the contest setting inducing the time constraint.
—Control Condition Pay all workers
—Experimental Condition 1 Pay top worker
—Experimental Condition 2 Pay top 5 workers
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—Experimental Condition 3 Pay top 10 workers
We evaluated task performance in terms of task output (i.e., volume of work done).
To assess the task output, we measured the total and average number of texts anno-
tated by the annotators.
7. RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results of our experiment runs, specifically, how the
task output from contests yields a significant increase when compared to the baseline
control condition. We then discuss the difference in annotation times across the control
and experimental conditions, which is a direct consequence of the contest setting.
Then, we touch on the speed vs. quality trade-off that we incur as an aftereffect
of the gain in task output. Finally, we revisit the subject of exits, which comes as a
result of potential loss of utility on the part of the crowd workers. We tie this to the
reward spread to explain how a change in reward spread can potentially stave off task
abandonment.
(a) Total annotations by all workers (b) Distinct annotations by all workers
(c) Average annotations per worker (d) Number of active annotators
(e) Total annotations by top worker (f) Total annotations by top 10 workers
Fig. 8: Task output
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7.1. Task output
The results in Fig. 8 illustrate how a change in reward spread leads to a change in the
number of annotations submitted by workers. The central aim of the requester is to
elicit as many annotations from the workers as possible (within the time constraint).
Therefore, Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b paint a picture of how an increase in the reward spread
realises this objective. Both figures compare the total and distinct number of annota-
tions in each of our experimental conditions, against the annotations from the baseline
control condition.
From Fig. 8a, the null hypothesis would lead us to believe that the population mean
of worker annotations (given by the control condition) is a total of 1, 062 labels in the
given time window. The alternative hypothesis from our experimental conditions sug-
gest otherwise: that setting the task as a contest leads to a different mean, which
varies by the reward spread. The resulting hypothesis that contests leads to more
annotations is statistically significant. A corollary can be drawn from the distinct an-
notations in Fig. 8b.
We then carried out a one-way ANOVA test on the total annotations from the differ-
ent experimental conditions to see if there was statistical significance as a result of a
change in the reward spreads. Across the 3 conditions: pay top worker (µ = 1, 322,
σ = 100.40), pay top 5 workers (µ = 1, 502, σ = 132.22) and pay top 10 workers
(µ = 1, 886, σ = 134.35), we obtained results that give evidence to the significance of the
results. The F-ratio value is 67.19, the p-value is ¡ .00001, and the result is significant
at p ¡ .05.
Fig. 8c highlights the fairly constant average number of annotations by all the work-
ers. This at first appears to contradict the results we described in Figures 8a and 8b.
However, Fig. 8d illustrates that the number of active annotators varied across the
three experimental conditions. This result also buttresses the significance of the dif-
ferent reward spreads in retaining more annotators. Furthermore, a clearer picture
of the number of annotations among workers is evidenced in the the last two Figures
8e and 8f. The results make plain the effect of varying the reward spread which has
stronger impacts on the top workers.
7.2. Annotation time
In Fig. 9 we compare the time spent annotating an entity in the different experimental
conditions against the time spent by workers in the control condition.
Fig. 9: Average annotation time per entity
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In the control condition, workers were not placed under any specific time constraint,
however, inherent timely completion was required to receive their task compensation.
Therefore, they still had an incentive to complete the annotations without any delay.
In the control condition, workers needed on average 9.70 seconds to identify and anno-
tate an entity in a tweet. The calculated times in the experimental conditions were as
follows: pay top worker (µ = 4.68s, σ = 0.08), pay top 5 workers (µ = 4.65s, σ = 0.32)
and pay top 10 workers (µ = 4.77s, σ = 0.15).
The results from the contests are significant when compared to the baseline con-
dition which didn’t have the explicit time constraint. Contest annotators needed an
average of 4.70s to recognise a type of an entity while regular annotators spent 9.70s
per entity. This is equivalent to an increased annotation factor of almost 2x across all
contests. Contest annotators spent an average of 5.6s annotating one tweet (at 1.2 en-
tities per tweet) and the top contestants averaged 2.69s per entity, resulting in a gain
factor of 3.6x against the baseline.
7.3. Annotation quality
An increase in annotation speed however led us to incur a hit in annotation quality as
reflected in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10: Annotation quality: Precision, Recall and F1 scores for annotating Person
(PER), Organisation (ORG), Location (LOC) and Miscellaneous (MISC) entities
The results presented in Fig. 10 reflect a fine grained analysis of precision, recall
and F1 scores on the 4 entity types (PER, ORG, LOC and MISC) across the experimen-
tal and baseline conditions. The results follow the same pattern i.e., the same entity
types are equally difficult to identify across all conditions. However, the baseline con-
dition which was free from time constraints resulted in better scores. The scores were
computed against the gold standards published with the four datasets used for the
experiments.
This result helps inform us as to what tasks contests might be better suited for. A
requester seeking to adopt contests needs to be able to tolerate a certain level of false
positives and false negatives which would be compensated for by the timeliness of the
responses. Verifying the quality of worker submissions (without using inter-annotator
agreement scores) however leads to a recursive chicken and egg scenario; for if we
were able to automatically compute the quality of the annotations (i.e., by using a gold
standard), then what did we need the crowd for? Or better yet, how can we design
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contests, and assign ranks in a way that creates quality output without falling prey to
malicious workers who make quick but incorrect submissions?
In this case, we posit that the task design should be one that satisfies the following
two conditions: (a) the worker solution could not have been easily computed automati-
cally; but (b) the worker solution can be computationally verified easily without a gold
standard. An example of such a scenario is in the fold.it game [Cooper et al. 2010]
where players fold the structures of selected proteins. Determining a protein’s struc-
ture is computationally demanding, however, humans are able to intuitively arrive at
the best structural composition. Once this has been done, the verification process be-
comes straightforward making this task a prime candidate for carrying out this form
of contest based crowdsourcing without a gold standard.
7.4. Contest exit behaviour
Only a subset of contestants received a monetary payoff. The longer workers engaged
with a task, the more utility they potentially lost given their ranking relative to the
reward spread. Some workers therefore opted to leave the contest prematurely. Fig-
ure 11 presents the exit behaviour of workers across the 3 experimental conditions.
The results imply that the beginning of the contests sees fewer exits with most of the
contestants choosing to continue for up to 90% of the total time period. The exit rates
increase towards the end. This behaviour would be peculiar to microtask contests un-
like more longitudinal contests such as presidential elections (studied by [Norrander
2006]), in which most contenders exit at the beginning of the race leading up to much
fewer participants at the final elections.
Fig. 11: Number of active annotators at different stages of the contest. The stages are
marked at 5% time interval steps throughout the contest.
8. DISCUSSION
In this section, we highlight lessons learned from the experiments, the challenges of
scaling contests to real-time annotations, and the limitations of our approach and re-
sults.
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8.1. General considerations
Crowdsourcing remains a mechanism with tremendous potential to grow economies
by engaging a large workforce on demand and at scale. This translates into improved
productivity and significant benefits for task requesters and crowd workers alike.
Requesters gain task scalability, quick completion and lower price margins for their
projects, while workers achieve additional income and learn new skills. In addressing
crowdsourcing as a sociotechnical construct, in this paper we focus on one of the crowd-
sourcing challenges from the list discussed in [Kittur et al. 2013]: real-time crowd
work. Tackling this challenge, we developed a model which encourages workers to per-
form well even in time-sensitive situations by using micropayments and contests.
8.2. Layering incentives on top of payments
Our experiments showed that competitions could work in paid microtask crowdsourc-
ing, both as an alternative to common task models and as a means to complete tasks
faster. On average, workers carried out their tasks twice as fast as the baseline work-
ers, while top performers were three times as fast. When we varied the number of
workers who got paid in the experiments from 1 to 5 to 10, we noticed that the average
volume of work also went up, with workers perceiving a greater chance to receive part
of the available reward. As expected, in all the contest experiments, the gain in speed
came at a cost and this was a trade-off for quality. When we compared the quality of
submissions in the baseline experiments with that in the contest, we reported a drop
in precision of entity identification and total recall of various entity types. In study-
ing the exit patterns of workers from the task, we were keen to understand at what
time in the contest do most players quit (potentially due to their inability to poten-
tially finish in the reward spots). Given the intrinsic fun that comes from participation
asides from receiving a potential financial payout, many workers (a minimum of 85%
per condition) were willing to stay for almost the entire contest time. It was also quite
intriguing that 49 workers rated the contest experience as 3.5 out of 5, despite only 9 of
them receiving an actual payout, which makes us believe there must have been some
form of satisfaction derived from the competition.
Our experiments give further insight into the dynamics of crowd behaviour. Workers
posted on forums to notify others when a new contest was set up in order to quickly get
100 workers into the task. This was consistent to our prior image-labelling experiments
that used Wordsmith - in [Feyisetan et al. 2015] we noted that some workers even
promoted the game to their friends. During the study Wordsmith was used to label
images by users who were not recruited via CrowdFlower who found out about the
platform via social channels.
8.3. The role of financial rewards
With the contests, we investigated the interplay between the reward spread and crowd
behaviour. Allowing more workers to be eligible for payment improved the overall per-
formance. With more winning spots came an increase in the total and average task
output by all participants. Having a higher reward spread also ensured that workers
stayed in the context and did not drop out early, thus leading to more tasks completed.
This further meant that more effort was required to achieve one of the top spots in the
ranking, which would receive a payment.
However, indefinitely increasing the reward spread would defeat the purpose of
adopting a contest model, converging towards a traditional microtask system. Our re-
sults show that the linear result growth begins to break down as expected at some
point. It is important to note that the motivation of crowd workers covers a wide spec-
trum of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, hence, having a wider reward spread (and a
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higher task threshold as seen in C6) led to a plummet in task output (over repeated
experiment runs). An investigation into the discussion forums indicated that this ex-
periment was probably less challenging – as stated by one worker, ”... to get into the top
10 is not too difficult ...” - and hence might not have been as attractive to top perform-
ers. Understanding where to draw the line would be the subject of further empirical
studies paired up with theoretical analysis.
8.4. Scaling towards real-time annotations
Microtask crowdsourcing has often been praised for its ability to produce results
quickly and accurately. Yet, an increasing number of applications come in with much
harder time constraints, which push the boundaries of the traditional microtask model
to deliver in seconds or less [Bernstein et al. 2011]. Examples of such real-time crowd-
sourcing applications include machine learning for image recognition [von Ahn and
Dabbish 2004] and text-to-speech conversion [Lasecki et al. 2013]; accessibility design
[Bigham et al. 2010; Lasecki et al. 2012; Lasecki et al. 2013]; and disaster management
[Gao et al. 2011].
The study lends support to our hypothesis that the microtask contest model leads
to timely task completion without the associated overhead costs. Our results show an
increase in speed by an average factor of 2x, and up to 3x more among the top perform-
ers. These metrics could be used to inform decisions on the number of workers that
would be needed to annotate the entire dataset of 7, 600 tweets in real-time - taking
into consideration the total number of non-unique annotations and worker exit e.g., in
experiment C5, workers annotated 1981 tweets, equivalent to 384 workers required to
make one pass at the entire stream. Our experiments were carried out on a stream of
20 tweets per second; the live Twitter stream is currently estimated at 6, 000 tweets
per second or 2, 400 English tweets per second (40% of the full stream) [Feyisetan et al.
2014]. Annotating 10% of the live stream could be potentially carried out by designing
a contest for 4, 600 workers (i.e., 384 workers * ((10% of 2, 400) / 20 tweets per second)).
8.5. A diverse crowd
Across all experimental conditions, we have observed a range of responses to the in-
centives we layered on top of micropayments, which varied depending on a range of
factors, including the amount of work already completed and the likelihood to be re-
warded. During the contests, top contributors showed a different behaviour in the con-
ditions with larger reward spreads. These findings suggest the need for additional
experiments, which would investigate the effects of the different incentives on differ-
ent groups of workers - for example, those who contributed a lot in terms of output,
but also those who over achieve in terms of quality. This would potentially allow us
to predict exit behaviour more accurately, and offer finer grained incentives - for in-
stance, one could imagine different bonus levels based on how many objects a worker
has annotated so far.
8.6. Application to active learning
Active learning is a machine learning paradigm that seeks to minimise the time and
crowdsourced labels required to train a machine learning model [Settles 2012]. Since
the objective of active learning is to scale down the the amount of labels required,
it is of necessity that the labels be of high quality. However, in large scale real-time
active learning and crowdsourcing scenarios [Vijayanarasimhan and Grauman 2014;
Yan et al. 2011], a single ‘oracle’ providing labels will not suffice. Just as active learning
algorithms refine the model and suggest the few training examples required, crowd-
sourcing contests refine the annotator pool to provide the ‘expert crowd’ required to
improve the model’s decision boundary. Applying the contest model in an active learn-
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ing setting suggests that contest incentives do not always have to optimise for speed
(unlike in the real-time scenario). This opens up avenues for future research into in-
centives in high-value judgement tasks that are aligned more towards annotator skill
and less towards completion speed.
8.7. Payments and ethical considerations
Crowd worker motivation remains a constant research area in understanding why
people partake in microtasks. This is essential in order to design systems that are
fair and rewarding to the workers. A requester would always seek to minimise cost,
however, a worker’s complete range of motivations is not yet fully understood. Our
investigations revealed that the task model was relatively well received: in one of the
baseline experiments, 87 workers rated the payment of $0.10 as 4 out of 5, while in
one of our contests, 49 workers rated it as 3.5 on the same scale despite only 9 of them
receiving an actual payout. (The numbers 87 and 49 represent all the workers who gave
feedback on the task). Furthermore, workers seemed to be eager to return - as stated
in a crowd discussion forum, one of the participants posted ”Hit the top 10 today. I will
hunt this problem again”, while another one felt let down when they couldn’t be among
the 100 contestants: ”Yesterday I came across this, but [they] recruited 100 people, [I]
was not allowed to play”.
On task payment, we favoured a higher than average payment of $0.10 as against the
annotation averages reported by [Difallah et al. 2015], however, it would be interesting
to see the effects of increased payments on the results. In a related set of experiments
we noted that raising the reward to as much as $0.25 rather created an anchoring ef-
fect than a trend in results. We would like to investigate this further and also analyse
the effect of task payment ordering. A greater understanding of worker intrinsic mo-
tivations would help in the design of better payment schemes, wrapped around task
models that workers find inherently engaging and rewarding; and lend insights into
the ongoing debate on ethical and fair crowdsourcing [Irani and Silberman 2013].
8.8. Limitations
While the results of our experiments were very promising, we are aware of several
limitations of our work. The experiments are run on text annotation tasks. It would
be interesting to test the models on the other five types of tasks from [Gadiraju et al.
2014]. While our experiments and theories could be easily adapted to similar task
types, in particular to output-agreement ones [von Ahn and Dabbish 2004], they are
less suitable for settings in which a diversity of answers is sought. As a result, there is
much latitude for future work across the different incentive schemes and the concept of
furtherance incentives as a whole. The tasks we tested do not require a high cognitive
load, time investment or creativity. Other types of tasks might be less suitable for
a casual game model like the one in Wordsmith. Moreover, the results will probably
vary when the tasks are carried out by a community who is intrinsically motivated
(for example, to advance science as in citizen science projects, or to help, as in disaster
relief). Those motivations would probably overshadow the simpler mechanisms tested
here. In addition, such intrinsic motivation settings have been shown to be more prone
to overjustification effects, and any attempt to use incentives to reward contributions
might have negative effects.
Just like most empirical research in paid microtask crowdsourcing, none of the ex-
periments considered temporal effects. While contests may produce positive effects
short-term, it would be interesting to understand whether workers would continue to
engage more with no additional incentives as tasks run over longer periods of time.
One common concern related to virtual rewards is that they are not always aligned
with the needs and values of the user and that this mismatch becomes more obvious
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with time [Deterding et al. 2011]. In our experiments we have not carried out an in-
depth study of the types of workers who used Wordsmith or try to understand what
drives them. While the experiments were successful, we anticipate that we would need
to have a much more nuanced approach to contest-based incentives when workers en-
gage with us over longer periods of time.
Our contest experiments allowed us to get a sense of the number of contributors re-
quired to annotate a substantial share of the data feed in near-real-time. However, our
findings might not transfer to scenarios with contests that stretch over days or longer.
In the same time, in a real-world scenario, most human labelling projects that operate
with large amounts of data would also include an algorithmic component, trained by
labels created by the crowd.
Finally, our work assumes that there is a gold standard to verify crowd answers.
This is particularly important in time-sensitive scenarios.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our experiments have explored the effects of layered incentive mechanisms on a base
financial payment model on crowd performance and engagement. The results suggest
that we can build better crowdsourcing systems for task requesters and workers alike;
and that money need not be the only currency for transacting on paid microtask plat-
forms
In line with the research on timely task completion, we intend to carry out new real-
time crowdsourcing experiments which feature automatically verifiable task output
which is currently a limitation of our current approach. We would also carry out cross
studies between social incentives-based microtasks and contest-based tasks in a bid to
understand how the former could be used to facilitate the latter. Our approach to use
competitions to deliver timely annotations naturally engenders worker exit given the
varying utilities gained by individual workers during the contest. By doing so, it offers
us a way to gain insight into how the different parameters we use to our probabilistic
exit predictor impact behaviour.
Overall, our results reinforced the role of motivation and incentives beyond cash
payments as the primary means to reward participation on some of the most pop-
ular crowdsourcing platforms of our times. Our experiments give crowdsourcing re-
searchers and platform designers new empirical evidence into crowdsourcing as a fully
fledged sociotechnical construct with challenges requiring as much a social touch as
the technical. Worker motivations cover a wide spectrum, which extends beyond the
simplistic spectrum of ‘fun and money’. Understanding how to keep the crowd engaged
is essential not just to yield superior returns for requesters, but also to create a more
humane experience, as crowdsourcing continues to take its place as the model for the
future of work.
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